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2010 National Environmental Law Moot Court  
Competition Problem*  
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT 
___________________________________ 
 
FRIENDS OF RESPONSIBLE TRADE ׀ 
and two of its members,  
ACE VENTURA and JUAN VALDEZ ׀ 
 Appellants,   
 v. ׀           CIVIL ACTION 
GREEN RECYCLING GROUP, INC.              Civ. 09-1001 
and ׀ 
NEWTOWN PARENT TEACHERS  
ASSOCIATION, INC. ׀ 
 Appellees, 
 v. ׀ 
LISA JACKSON ADMINISTRATOR, 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, ׀ 
 Intervenor-Appellee 
___________________________________  
 
ORDER 
 
Following the issuance of the Order of the District Court 
dated August 31, 2009, in the above-captioned matter; all parties 
filed a Notice of Appeal.  Appellant Friends of Responsible Trade 
(FRT), along with two of its members, take issue with the 
decision of the lower court with respect to (1) its standing as a 
membership organization and as individuals, (2) the dismissal of 
all Alien Tort Claims Act claims for the injuries to Appellant 
 
* The 2010 Problem was written by Pace Law School Professor Jeffery G. 
Miller, Vice Dean for Academic Affairs, with the assistance of Alexandra 
Dapolito Dunn, Pace Law School Assistant Dean of Environmental Law 
Programs and Adjunct Professor of Law and Sean T. Dixon, Research Fellow for 
the Pace Law School Center for Environmental Legal Studies. 
 
1
NELMCC  
826 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  27 
Juan Valdez, (3) the denial of relief under RCRA citizen suit 
provisions due to lack of ongoing violations by the Appellees 
Green Recycling Group Inc. (GRG) and Newtown Parent Teachers 
Association, Inc. (Newtown PTA), and (4) the determination as to 
the non-hazardous nature of the exported solid waste.  The 
Environmental Protection Agency (and Lisa Jackson as 
Administrator) (EPA or United States) takes issue with (1) the 
determination as to the inapplicability of RCRA to the contents of 
container #VS2078. 
 
 Therefore, it hereby ordered that the parties brief all of the 
following issues: 
 
1. Whether Appellant FRT has sufficient constitutional or 
statutory standing to bring any action against GRG and 
Newtown PTA for violations resulting from the export of 
container #VS2078 to Geraldo Garcia’s recycling plant. 
(GRG and Newtown PTA argue that FRT and its members 
have no standing to sue over the exported materials; FRT 
argues that there is standing under ATCA and RCRA; EPA 
argues that RCRA applies but the ATCA does not.)**  
2. Whether the ATCA provides an alternate basis for 
plaintiffs’ standing. (GRG and Newtown PTA argue that the 
court properly dismissed the applicability of the statute; 
EPA argues that, as a matter of policy, its regulations are 
sufficient to protect the interests of foreign citizens and that 
expansion of ATCA claims would be an impediment to the 
administrative process; FRT argues that the international 
custom and Congressional action on the issue supports a 
claim of jurisdiction under ATCA).  
3. Whether a dismissal of the suit as between FRT and GRG 
and Newtown PTA (the original parties) ends the action 
with respect to the intervenor EPA’s claims.  (GRG and 
Newtown PTA argue that it does as the EPA can bring its 
own enforcement actions at any time; EPA argues that 
justice would best be served by allowing the action to 
continue with EPA as a party and that the EPA has an 
 
** Grayed out text was added or changed in response to official NELMCC 
Q&A period and can be used by all teams. 
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independent, jurisdictional basis for its involvement in the 
action; FRT agrees that in the interests of justice, if its case 
is dismissed, the EPA should still be allowed to continue 
litigation in order to resolve the situation at hand).  
4. Whether the lower court properly analyzed the facts in 
terms of the solid waste nature of the exported materials, 
and, whether the export of container #VS2078 in the 
manner described subjects GRG and Newtown PTA to 
RCRA liability.  (GRG and Newtown PTA argue that they 
are not subject to RCRA liability as their goods cease to be 
“solid waste” once they are sent outside the United States 
for recycling; FRT and EPA argue that RCRA nonetheless 
applies to the exported waste).  
5. Whether the materials exported are considered hazardous 
for the purposes of RCRA; and, therefore, whether GRG and 
Newtown PTA are liable for violating the testing and 
reporting provisions of RCRA’s hazardous waste sections. 
(GRG and Newtown PTA argue that the materials in 
container #VS2078 are not hazardous as defined under 
RCRA; EPA and FRT argue that because no exceptions 
apply and these types of materials are known to be toxic, the 
materials are hazardous for the purposes of RCRA). 
 
SO ORDERED 
 
Entered this 29th day of September, 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[NOTE: No cases decided after September 1, 2009 may be cited either in the 
briefs or in oral argument.] 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF 
NEW UNION 
___________________________________ 
 
FRIENDS OF RESPONSIBLE TRADE ׀ 
and two of its members,  
ACE VENTURA and JUAN VALDEZ ׀ 
 Appellants,   
 v. ׀           CIVIL ACTION 
GREEN RECYCLING GROUP, INC.              Civ. 08360-2008 
and ׀ 
NEWTOWN PARENT TEACHERS  
ASSOCIATION, INC. ׀ 
 Appellees, 
 v. ׀ 
LISA JACKSON ADMINISTRATOR, 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, ׀ 
 Intervenor-Appellee 
___________________________________  
 
ORDER 
 
Friends of Responsible Trade (FRT) and two individual 
members of that organization filed a complaint (with all notice 
obligations fulfilled) against the Green Recycling Group, Inc. and 
the Newtown Parent Teachers Association (together defendants, 
GRG, or GRG and Newtown PTA), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§6972(a)(1)(A), alleging that GRG and Newtown PTA violated the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§6901 et 
seq. (RCRA), by sending used electronic devices (UEDs) abroad 
for salvage and recycling without complying with the 
requirements of RCRA pertaining to the disposal of hazardous 
waste.  FRT and its two members seek civil penalties for the 
violations, an injunction against further violations of RCRA, and 
compensatory damages for injuries suffered by the two members 
as a result of the violations.  One of FRT’s members also bases 
jurisdiction for his claim for personal injury on the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (ATCA).  The United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or United States) filed a 
motion to intervene pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6972(d).  After full 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/9
NELMCC  
2010] NELMCC COMPETITION PROBLEM 829 
discovery, FRT, joined by the United States, filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment against GRG and Newtown PTA, 
asking this Court to find that they have violated RCRA, and 
leaving the remedial portion of this action for disposition after 
trial.  Thereafter, GRG and Newtown PTA filed a countermotion 
for summary judgment against FRT and the United States, 
asking for a ruling either 1) that this court has no jurisdiction to 
entertain the action by FRT and its members (and that the EPA 
would then be prevented from carrying on litigation without the 
original parties) or 2) that GRG and Newtown PTA have not 
violated RCRA.  The United States agreed with GRG and 
Newtown PTA that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear 
the case brought by FRT and its members under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act (arguing that the agency’s regulations sufficiently 
address the environmental concerns of international transport of 
hazardous and solid waste and that to confer jurisdiction under 
the ATCA would arbitrarily circumvent EPA administrative 
procedure), but argued that the court does have jurisdiction to 
hear the claim of the United States that GRG and Newtown PTA 
have violated RCRA. 
Plaintiff FRT and its members lack standing to sue GRG and 
Newtown PTA for RCRA violations under all theories of standing.  
As member Ventura has no injury in fact that is fairly traceable 
to GRG’s actions, and as member Valdez cannot prove that his 
injuries were the result of actions by GRG and Newtown PTA, 
membership organization FRT and its members lack 
constitutional standing.  Under RCRA, no plaintiff has standing 
because there is no ongoing violation, plaintiff Valdez is not a 
citizen of the United States, and because the harms suffered by 
the plaintiffs were caused by the actions of a negligent recycling 
factory operator, RCRA does not afford the plaintiffs statutory 
standing.  Plaintiff Valdez does not have ATCA jurisdiction as 
that law does not allow for hazardous pollution concerns of one 
nation’s citizen to be voiced in the United States absent a law of 
nations or customary international law.  As the plaintiff has no 
standing to continue litigation, intervenor EPA must, and did, 
show that there is a proper basis for continuing the litigation 
without the original plaintiffs—namely, EPA’s independent 
ability to enforce RCRA against GRG and Newtown PTA.  Upon 
an examination of the facts, however, this Court concludes that 
5
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the waste collected by GRG and Newtown PTA was household in 
nature and thus exempt from hazardous classification under 
RCRA, and accordingly, are exempt from RCRA. 
 
The Factual Background 
 
The following facts are not contested.  GRG is in the business 
of collecting UEDs for sale to foreign salvagers and recyclers.  It 
collects these materials by entering into partnerships with 
community organizations, such as Newtown PTA, who, in turn, 
solicit UEDs from neighborhood households.  GRG requires 
anyone seeking free collection of UEDs to execute a form 
acknowledging that the particular devices collected were owned 
by them and used in their households.  After collecting sufficient 
UEDs to fill a shipping container, GRG ships the container to a 
salvage and recycling company abroad to salvage still useable 
UEDs and components and to reclaim precious metals and 
plastics from the remaining unusable UEDs.  All items in the 
container are from the Newtown PTA event. 
Ace Ventura and Juan Valdez are both members of FRT.  
FRT is a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) membership-based organization that 
advocates for Responsible Trade practices on behalf of its members, 
which include citizens from all parts of the United States, and in some 
cases, foreign nations.  Ventura, a freelance photojournalist and 
citizen of the United States, learned that UEDs were often sent 
abroad to unregulated recycling facilities whose activities 
sometimes injured employees, neighbors, and the environment.  
He identified an effort by GRG and Newtown PTA to collect 
UEDs in the town of Newtown, State of New Union.  Newtown 
PTA solicited members of local households to bring their UEDs to 
the parking lot of the Newtown High School on two particular 
Saturdays for recycling.  Newtown PTA told the residents that 
their devices would either be reused for their original purposes in 
a less developed country or recycled to put their components to 
good use.  GRG supplied the shipping container for the UEDs and 
Newtown PTA’s members supervised the collection of the 
material.  The Newtown PTA members placed devices in the 
container only after a visual examination showed that all of the 
UEDs were intact and after residents signed a form (supplied by 
GRG) stating that “I (we) have used the electronic devices 
identified below in my (our) home and wish to have them used by 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/9
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others or recycled because they are no longer useful to us.  All 
UEDs placed into the container are intact.”  The form included 
spaces to identify the particular electronic device(s) rendered.  A 
significant number of the UEDs were MyPhones.  MyPhones are 
a larger, less versatile, version of the popular Apple iPhone.  
Unlike the Apple iPhone (which has taken steps to use only 
environmentally friendly materials), the MyPhone uses a 
mercury-lithium battery and small quantities of other toxic 
materials, including lead.  The significant difference between the two 
devices is that the MyPhone contains a mercury-lithium battery, and 
more lead and other toxic materials than the iPhone.  Newtown, which 
is the home to the MyPhone corporate headquarters, was chosen 
as one of many test-run audiences for the device, but the 
concurrently-released iPhone quickly ran the MyPhone market to 
the ground.  The MyPhone, while able to play music, connect to 
the internet, and even act as a walkie-talkie, could not adequately 
make phone calls.  As such, most Newtown residents found 
themselves with a heavy, useless device.  Newtown PTA and GRG 
thereafter developed the recycling program that led to the 
litigation at hand. 
Ventura photographed many of the UEDs that Newtown 
PTA’s members had placed in container simply labeled  #VS2078 in 
the Newtown PTA High School parking lot on June 19, 2008, 
including used normal cell phones, pagers, televisions, computers 
and computer components, all intact.  The MyPhones shown in 
the photographs appear to be intact, some even in their original 
packaging.  Affidavits from GRG officials state that most of the 
bulk of the container was comprised of MyPhones from the 
Newtown residents.  Ventura ascertained that container #VS2078 
was entirely filled with material collected at Newtown PTA on 
two successive Saturdays and was sent by GRG a week later to 
Geraldo Garcia, in the city of Pacifica, Sud-Americano.  Sud-
Americano is a developing country with no regulatory scheme 
governing the recycling of UEDs or the pollution resulting from 
such activities.  Sud-Americano is a NON-OECD nation, but has 
ratified the Basel Convention. No other paperwork, aside from 
customs documents, was used by GRG in the international 
shipment of the container to Sud-Americano. 
Garcia sorts UEDs and their components, including those in 
container #VS2078, to separate out those still useful in the Sud-
7
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Americano market, either selling them in that market or 
donating them, particularly the laptops and computers, to local 
schools.  He operates only in the city of Pacifica.  He hires local 
residents to reclaim heavy metals and other valuable materials 
from the remaining unusable UEDs, including those in container 
#VS2078.  He salvages approximately half of the devices or their 
components by volume for reuse in Sud-Americano.  He had 
conducted these operations over a period of six years prior to 
receipt of container #VS2078 from GRG. Because Garcia failed to 
supply the workers with protective devices, including gloves and 
masks, or equipment designed for safe removal of material from 
the UEDs, the workers, including appellant and FRT member 
Juan Valdez, were directly exposed to mercury, lead, cadmium, 
chromium and other toxic materials, endangering their health.  
Valdez had worked in Garcia’s operations from their inception.  
In addition, because Garcia failed to properly collect, contain, and 
manage waste from the operations, mercury, lead and other 
heavy metals entered into the water and land of the local 
environment, further endangering local inhabitants (including 
Juan Valdez) and potentially endangering anyone encountering 
the local environment (including Ace Ventura). 
Ventura made a documentary film of the activities of GRG, 
Newtown PTA, and Garcia, highlighting the exposure of Valdez, 
and other workers and residents, to the toxic materials sourced in 
recycled UEDs supplied by GRG and others, and the injuries 
possibly caused by those exposures.  Indeed, expert medical 
deposition testimony established that Valdez suffers from 
memory and neurological losses “of the type caused by lead and 
mercury poisoning.”  Ventura’s film, “Toxic Recycling,” has been 
awarded prizes for the best documentary film at three different 
film festivals, has aired on public television, and has earned over 
$100,000 for Ventura, net of expenses.  Ventura has no present 
physical manifestations of injury from exposure to toxic material. 
 
Constitutional Standing 
 
Plaintiffs in this case are FRT, Ventura, and Valdez, bringing 
suit under RCRA’s citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. §6972.  FRT 
argues that it has standing to bring this case based on theories of 
representational standing as outlined in Sierra Club v. Morton.  
For an organization to show standing under Morton, as a 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/9
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threshold matter that organization must demonstrate that it has 
individual members who would have standing.  FRT asserts 
representational standing based on two contentions: (1) because 
its member, Juan Valdez, was injured by exposure to mercury, 
lead and other substances from GRG’s and Newtown PTA’s 
activities violating RCRA and (2) because its member Ace 
Ventura, was exposed to and injured by the same substances 
while filming in Pacifica and is afraid to return to Pacifica 
because he would suffer further exposure to toxic contamination.  
In this regard, Valdez and Ventura claim standing on the same 
basis: the environmental degradation and pollution resulting 
from GRG and Newtown PTA’s export activities. 
Standing, of course, requires that the plaintiff have suffered 
an injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the alleged violation 
and which is susceptible to remedy by the court.  Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992). 
Neither Valdez nor Ventura can make this showing.  Therefore, 
FRT is unable to demonstrate it merits representational 
standing. Valdez has not established that GRG’s and Newtown 
PTA’s alleged violations of RCRA caused him an injury for a 
number of reasons.  Although there is no doubt that Valdez is 
suffering injuries, he cannot demonstrate that his injuries are 
fairly traceable to the complained-of action.  Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561.  First, he has presented no 
evidence that his injuries were actually caused by lead and 
mercury poisoning, just that they were consistent with lead and 
mercury poisoning.  Second, assuming Valdez’ injuries were 
caused by lead and mercury poisoning, he has presented no 
evidence they were caused by lead and mercury from material in 
container #VS2078.  Indeed, because Valdez had done similar 
work, with similar exposures for six years prior to the arrival of 
that container, it is far more likely that his injuries were caused 
by previous exposures to similar material than by exposure to 
#VS2078 material.  Third, it was the failure of Garcia to properly 
conduct his recycling operations that exposed Valdez to lead and 
mercury, not the collection and shipment of the material by GRG 
and Newtown PTA. 
Ventura alleges no particular physical injury from GRG’s and 
Newtown PTA’s activities.  He testified that he was so 
emotionally upset by seeing gross pollution emanating from 
9
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Garcia’s operations and by seeing workers, such as Valdez, who 
were “obviously” injured by such pollution, that he is afraid to 
return to Pacifica.  He testified that the sights in Pacifica brought 
him to tears.  If so, they were crocodile tears.  Ventura was not 
injured by these sights; to the contrary, they benefitted him 
enormously, literally bringing him fame and fortune. 
As neither Ventura nor Valdez has demonstrated an injury-
in-fact, neither one has Constitutional standing to bring the case 
now before the Court.  Furthermore, as FRT’s representational 
standing argument rests upon the standing of Ventura and 
Valdez, it also fails.  None of the Plaintiffs therefore have 
standing to bring this case and it must be dismissed in favor of 
the defendants GRG and Newtown PTA.  Given, however, the 
potential for alternative bases of jurisdiction for the plaintiffs 
under RCRA and the Alien Tort Claims Act, and the potential 
continuation of litigation by the EPA, the analysis does not end 
here. 
 
Statutory Standing: RCRA 
 
Plaintiffs’ claims fail to establish jurisdiction under RCRA.  
In a so-called RCRA “citizen suit,” citizens are empowered to 
enforce the statute when the government fails to do so.  Valdez 
cannot bring a citizen suit because simply put, Valdez is not a 
citizen of the United States.  Citizens of the United States have 
an interest to see that the laws of their country are enforced.  
Resident aliens or even visiting aliens may have a lesser interest 
in doing so.  But it is difficult to see how a citizen of another 
country who has never been in the United States and manifests 
no intention of visiting it has an interest to see that the laws of 
the United States are complied with.  Nothing in RCRA or its 
legislative history suggests that Congress meant to empower the 
world to enforce RCRA when it enacted 42 U.S.C. §6972.1 
 
 1. Even if Valdez had a legitimate citizen suit claim, 42 U.S.C. § 6972, 
authorizes as relief for violations of RCRA only injunctive relief for compliance 
and assessment of civil penalties payable to the United States Treasury.  
Payment of compensatory damages for physical injuries is not authorized.  
Thus, this court could not redress his physical injury under 42 U.S.C. § 6972, 
and therefore Valdez has no standing to pursue that claim under that section.  
Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 88 (1998).  While 
his claim might be susceptible to a claim for personal injury by way of pendant 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/9
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The RCRA citizen suit provision does not confer jurisdiction 
in this case even if Valdez or Ventura could themselves establish 
standing and even if GRG’s and Newtown PTA’s actions 
constituted a violation of RCRA.  That follows from the wording of 
42 U.S.C. §6972(a)(1)(A), which authorizes suit against persons 
alleged “to be in violation of RCRA.”  The statute does not enable 
actions based on wholly past actions.  The violation here occurred 
in 2008 and involved one shipment of one container (container 
#VS2078).  FRT alleges that GRG sent other containers of similar 
material abroad for recycling and will do so again.2  GRG admits 
that it sent other containers of similar material abroad for 
salvage and recycling on several previous and subsequent 
occasions, but never to Pacifica or anywhere else in Sud-
Americano.  It also admits that it has an open-ended contract 
with Garcia for potential future containers of UEDs to be sent to 
Pacifica under specified terms, but GRG states that no such 
shipments have occurred to date, presumably because of the 
pendency of this litigation.  Whether GRG has further dealings 
with Garcia in Pacifica, therefore, is purely speculative.  Under 
these circumstances, there is no present or imminent future 
violation by either Newtown PTA or GRG to confer standing 
under §6972(a)(1)(A).  Basel Action Network v. Maritime Admin., 
370 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2005). 
Valdez has presented no evidence that GRG or Newtown PTA 
participated in or even knew of Garcia’s disregard of the safety of 
his workers or the environment.  Finally, if GRG and Newtown 
PTA violated RCRA, they did so in the United States.  Their 
activities in the United States, however, did not cause Valdez’ or 
Ventura’s exposures to lead and mercury in Pacifica.  The only 
basis for jurisdiction left to FRT and its members is potential 
jurisdiction under the ATCA. 
 
 
 
jurisdiction, that is not the case here, for the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350 (ATCA) governs jurisdiction over such actions.  The ATCA does not grant 
jurisdiction to entertain any such action, as analyzed in some detail below.  To 
allow such an action in tort by an alien under pendant jurisdiction would 
subvert the restrictions on the jurisdiction of federal courts to entertain tort 
claims by aliens established by the ATCA. 
 2. It did not make such allegations with regard to Newtown PTA.  As far as 
Newtown PTA is concerned, this was a one-time, isolated activity. 
11
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Statutory Standing: ATCA 
 
Valdez also brings a claim under the ATCA based on the 
same injuries discussed above.  While Valdez’s injuries were not 
fairly traceable to a RCRA violation, Valdez argues that 
defendants’ tortious actions directly led to his concrete actual 
injuries.  Further, as ATCA enables plaintiffs to recover 
compensatory damages, a successful ATCA claim is not hampered 
by the redressability problems associated with the RCRA claim 
above.  Thus, this Court finds that Valdez has standing to 
proceed with his ATCA claim based on the constitutional 
requirements outlined in Lujan. 
Demonstration of Article III standing, however, does not 
automatically confer jurisdiction on this Court to hear the ATCA 
claim.  The ATCA provides jurisdiction for civil actions brought 
by aliens “for a tort only” and then only if the tort was “committed 
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”  
28 U.S.C. § 1350.  Torts giving rise to ATCA jurisdiction are few 
and far between, because treaties and the law of nations normally 
create obligations for countries, not for their citizens.  Valdez first 
cites the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Waste and Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 
I.L.M. 657 (the Basel Convention).  As its name implies, this 
treaty deals specifically with the activities at issue here.  
However, although this treaty has been ratified by 121 countries, 
the United States has not ratified it; it has only signed the treaty.  
Hence, even if GRG could have and did violate the Basel 
Convention, that violation would not constitute a violation of a 
treaty of the United States.  Valdez next cites the Convention on 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development of 
December 14, 1960 (the OECD Convention), which the United 
States did ratify.  The OECD Convention is only a framework 
convention, and it does not deal directly with the export of 
hazardous waste.  The OECD Council, however, has issued a set 
of requirements dealing with such export.  Decision-
Recommendation of the Council on Exports of Hazardous Wastes 
from the OECD Area, 5 June 1986-C(86)64/Final (the OECD 
Hazardous Waste Decision).  But the OECD Hazardous Waste 
Decision directs member countries—not their individual 
citizens—to take action to implement control of the export of 
hazardous wastes.  Hence GRG could not violate the Decision, 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss3/9
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only the United States could.  The United States has indeed 
taken actions to control such exports, including the enactment of 
RCRA, the promulgation of EPA regulations on hazardous waste 
export, and in the promulgation of OECD obligation regulations.  
42 U.S.C. §6939, 40 C.F.R. §§262.50–58, and 40 C.F.R. §§262.80–
.89.  However, RCRA and EPA’s regulations apply only to 
hazardous waste and, as concluded below, the UEDs at issue are 
not hazardous waste under RCRA. 
Valdez also argues that the Basel Convention and the OECD 
Hazardous Waste Decision Treaty establish the law of nations 
with regard to the export of hazardous waste.  Because the ATCA 
was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004), some argue that the only 
tortious actions recognized under the ATCA are those that 
violated the law of nations as it was understood in 1789, virtually 
limiting such actions to piracy.  See Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 
739-740 (Scalia, J. concurring); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 
726 F.2d 774, 798-827 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J. concurring).  The 
Supreme Court recently rejected this crabbed interpretation of 
the statute in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.  But the Court held that 
the ATCA creates no cause of action; it only creates jurisdiction 
and it does so only for a narrow range of torts: those resulting 
from violations of international law as widely recognized and well 
defined today as piracy was in 1789.  Valdez argues that the 
shipment of UEDs by GRG and Newtown PTA to recyclers in a 
third world country without that country’s consent violates the a 
well-defined norm of customary international law established by 
the Basel Convention and the OECD Hazardous Waste Decision.  
Use of the Basel Convention in this regard is suspect because the 
United States has not ratified it.  Valdez points to a holding that 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for 
signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.T.S. 397 (UNCLOS), established 
customary international law, even though the United States had 
not ratified UNCLOS, Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 
1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 
456 F. 3d. 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d 
in part, 487 F. 3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), hearing en banc granted, 
499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008).  
The strength of that precedent is lost in its subsequent history 
and uncertain ultimate resolution.  Nor is that precedent 
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persuasive, as it fails to note that the ATCA juxtaposes the “law 
of nations” and a “treaty of the United States,” treating them as 
separate, distinct, and different authorities.  If the ATCA may be 
invoked for violation of international law based on a treaty among 
nations other than the United States, the limitation of invoking 
the ATCA for violation of a treaty of the United States loses all 
vitality.  In any event, the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain cautions us to construe the ATCA narrowly, limiting it 
to violations of the law of nations that are well defined and well 
established, like piracy.  There is surely nothing well defined 
about regulations dealing with the export of hazardous waste.  
Even the determination of whether materials are hazardous 
waste is a mind-numbing journey, as is evident from our 
discussion below of whether the UEDs at issue here are 
hazardous waste.  There is simply no parallel between the then-
well-established crime of piracy and the commercial shipment 
abroad of used computers and cell phones. 
 
Continuation of Litigation by Intervenor 
 
At oral argument, the parties differed on the procedural 
effect that Plaintiffs’ lack of jurisdiction would have on the ability 
of the United States to continue the action.  GRG and Newtown 
PTA argued that dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ action on 
jurisdictional grounds was the end of the action, leaving no action 
in which the United States can continue as an intervenor.  The 
FRT and the EPA disagreed.  FRT argued that in the event that 
the case is dismissed, the United States EPA should be allowed to 
continue its action to enforce RCRA.  The EPA argued that it has 
an interest in the underlying controversy, namely, the potential 
RCRA violations.  As the plaintiffs have already been found to be 
lacking standing, it is incumbent upon this court to determine 
whether the EPA, in its own right, has an interest in the 
litigation. 
According to one court, there is “a difference between 
permitting the United States to play an active role during the 
pendency of private litigation, and permitting it to go forward 
with the litigation in its own right after the private parties have 
composed their differences.” Ruotolo v. Ruotolo, 572 F.2d 336, 339 
(1st Cir. 1978).  Here, the parties have not “composed their 
differences”, as such, but the question remains.  The Ruotolo 
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court continues to note that in order to decide whether to permit 
an intervening United States agency to continue litigation, the 
government “must possess some independent basis as a party 
apart from its status as intervenor”. Id., quoting Boston Tow Boat 
Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 632, 88 L. Ed. 975, 64 S. Ct. 776 
(1944).  The need for an intervening appellant to have its own 
basis of standing to continue litigation in the absence of the 
original plaintiff was discussed by the Supreme Court in 
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986), but in a manner not 
directly applicable here.  In Diamond, the Court decided that an 
intervening private citizen, to continue without the original 
plaintiff, needed to show Article III standing.  Id., at 69.  This 
Court concludes that EPA’s authority to intervene under 42 
U.S.C. § 6972(d) is analogous to the need for Article III standing 
articulated by the Court in Diamond.  Because the issue of RCRA 
violation falls within the direct purview of the EPA agency 
authority, it has sufficient interest, basis, and standing to 
continue the suit in absence of the original plaintiffs.3 
 
RCRA Violations 
 
RCRA establishes a so-called “cradle to grave” regulatory 
system to assure that hazardous waste is properly managed to 
avoid damage to persons or the environment.  It requires that 
most hazardous waste be treated, stored, or disposed of only at 
facilities with RCRA permits to handle that waste, in accordance 
with strict facility and operating requirements.  It prohibits the 
export of hazardous waste, except in compliance with 42 U.S.C. 
§6938, which requires that persons proposing to export hazardous 
waste notify EPA, obtain the written consent of the country to 
which the proposed export will be sent, and ensure compliance 
with any applicable treaties.  EPA has promulgated regulations 
 
 3. Defendants GRG and Newtown PTA argue that because the EPA is free 
to bring its own separate civil or criminal enforcement actions at any time, the 
proper place for any RCRA suit by the Administrator of EPA is there, not here.  
This contention is without merit as, under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(d), the EPA can 
intervene in whichever citizen suits it likes.  Such broad discretion indicates 
that Congress intended to allow the EPA to make the decision as to when and 
where to act towards the enforcement of RCRA.  Because it could intervene, and 
it did, this Court will not hold that decision against the agency. See Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 
2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). 
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to implement these requirements, 40 C.F.R. §262.50–.58.  
Whether particular material is subject to the RCRA regulatory 
scheme depends on whether that material meets the definition of 
“hazardous waste” that EPA has crafted in 40 C.F.R. Part 261.  A 
court more learned than this one has described navigating that 
definition to be a “mind-numbing journey.”  Am. Mining Cong. v. 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
Unfortunately, EPA has subsequently amended the definition to 
make it even longer and more complicated.  As both Congress and 
EPA have charted it, determining whether a material is a 
hazardous waste is a two-step process.  First, it must be 
determined if the material is a solid waste.  Second, if the 
material is a solid waste, it must be determined if the material is 
hazardous under criteria established by EPA. 
The EPA defines solid waste as “discarded material” not 
otherwise excluded, 40 C.F.R. §261.2(a)(1).  “Discarded material” 
is material that is “abandoned,” “recycled,” “inherently waste-
like,” or “a military munition,” 40 C.F.R. §261.2(2)(i).  Material is 
“abandoned” if it is “disposed of,” 40 C.F.R. §261.2(b).  When the 
citizens of New Union gave their UEDs to GRG and Newtown 
PTA, they were disposing of those devices, hence the devices 
became solid waste under this definition.  Materials are also 
abandoned if they are “recycled.”  40 C.F.R. §261.2(2)(i).  Even 
though some of the Newtown PTA-sourced UEDs that were not 
salvaged for reuse were recycled (possibly making them solid 
waste under this definition) they were recycled abroad and there 
is no indication in RCRA that Congress intended to extend the 
jurisdiction of RCRA to activities abroad.  Amlon Metals, Inc. v. 
FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Thus, once the 
materials left the United States, they were neither solid waste 
nor hazardous waste for the purposes of RCRA applicability to 
Garcia’s operations.  This does not mean, of course, that they 
were not solid waste in the United States or that the actions of 
GRG and Newtown PTA in the United States to ship the 
materials out of the United States were not subject to RCRA 
jurisdiction.  In fact, the very purpose of the Newtown PTA 
collection event was to collect “abandoned” and “disposed of” 
material—the MyPhone.  The materials in the container were 
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solid waste under RCRA jurisdiction while the container was in 
the United States.4 
Having established that the material is solid waste within 
the United States because it was disposed of here, we would 
normally continue to determine if the solid waste is hazardous, 
using the various tests and lists contained in the remainder of 
Part 261.  Neither UEDs nor used intact CRTs are contained in 
the lists of hazardous waste in Part 261.  EPA argues, however, 
that MyPhones test as hazardous under the toxicity test in 40 
C.F.R. §261.24.  The material that had been in container 
#VS2078, of course, is no longer available for testing.  Plaintiffs 
and EPA argue that is no matter for two reasons.  First, UEDs 
such as the MyPhone have routinely been found to fail the 
toxicity test. Hazardous Waste Management System; 
Modification of the Hazardous Waste Program; Cathode Ray 
Tubes and Mercury-Containing Equipment, 67 Fed. Reg. 40,508-
510 (June 12, 2002) and TIMOTHY G. TOWNSEND ET AL., RCRA 
TOXICITY CHARACTERIZATION OF CPUS AND OTHER DISGARDED 
ELECTRICAL DEVICES (2004), available at http://www.ees.ufl.edu 
/homepp/townsend/Research/ElectronicLeaching/UF%20EWaste%
20TC%20Report%20July%2004%20v1.pdf.  This, however, is only 
circumstantial evidence that the MyPhones in container #VS2078 
were hazardous by the toxicity test.  Second, Plaintiff and EPA 
argue that EPA’s regulations, 40 C.F.R. §262.11, require 
generators of solid waste to determine if their wastes are 
hazardous, and failure to make that determination is a criminal 
offense, 40 C.F.R. §262.11, United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 
(4th Cir. 1990).  If GRG did not make this determination, 
Plaintiffs and EPA argue, GRG violated RCRA and its solid waste 
should be deemed to be hazardous.  The problem with their 
argument is that GRG is not a generator of solid waste and hence 
is not subject to the determination requirement.  It is a mere 
collector of such material, generated by others.  EPA argues it is 
bringing enforcement actions under similar circumstances, In the 
matter of EarthEcycle, LLC, EPA Docket No. RCRA-HQ-2009-
0001, and that this Court should defer to its interpretation.  
 
 4. Unlike cathode ray tubes (similarly considered to contain toxic 
materials), there are no provisions of EPA regulations that exempt UEDs such 
as MyPhones from hazardous or solid waste RCRA applicability.  See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 261.39-.41. 
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EPA’s other enforcement action, of course, is not before this Court 
and EPA’s position there, and here, are just litigation positions, 
not entitled to much, if any, deference. 
GRG and Newtown PTA also point out 40 C.F.R. §261.4(b)(1), 
which provides that solid wastes are not hazardous wastes if they 
are “household waste.” This section defines, without much 
additional illumination, “household waste” as “material derived 
from households.”  GRG and Newtown PTA took considerable 
care to assure that they accepted only UEDs that were derived 
from households.  In short, while the UEDs at issue are solid 
waste, EPA’s exclusion of “household [solid] waste” from 
hazardous wastes removes it from the hazardous waste 
regulatory scheme.  Chicago v. Envtl Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 
(1994). 
EPA and Plaintiffs further argue that some of the UEDs at 
issue were not actually derived from households.  They point to 
one of Ventura’s pictures of three laptops in container #VS2078, 
each with a label reading “Property of the United States 
Government,” with a bar code beneath.  An affidavit from a 
federal security officer states that the bar code indicates the 
laptops were used, ironically, in the EPA office in New Union.  
EPA and Plaintiffs argue that however you characterize 
“Property of the United States Government,” it is not a 
household.  While EPA’s regulations are silent on that issue, EPA 
and Plaintiffs are correct on the point.  However, neither the 
labels nor the affidavit establish that the laptops came to the 
container directly from EPA rather than from a household.  
Moreover, the extensive precautions taken by GRG and Newtown 
PTA to confine the UEDs collected to household material were 
sufficient to prevent three laptops from changing the character of 
the whole container from household waste to non-household 
waste.  Similarly unpersuasive is the argument that because 
some of the MyPhones in the container were in their original 
packaging, they could not be household waste.  Again, the 
diligence with which GRG and Newtown PTA cautioned against 
any inclusion of non-household items proves significant.  While 
some community members may not have opened their MyPhones 
before discarding them, they no doubt purchased or acquired the 
item for its utility as a household phone.  That word spread about 
the dismal performance of the item and some people chose to 
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discard their MyPhones without inspection is not relevant to the 
household nature of the phone. 
 
Order 
 
The motion for partial summary judgment by FRT, its two 
members and EPA is denied on all grounds propounded.  The 
motion for summary judgment by GRG and Newtown PTA and 
EPA on the lack of jurisdiction of FRT and its members is 
granted.  The motion for summary judgment by GRG with respect 
to the intervenor’s rights on appeal is denied, but the remainder 
of the motion by GRG and Newtown PTA is granted as to all 
other grounds. 
 
SO ORDERED. 
 
Romulus N. Remus 
United States District Judge 
 
August 31, 2009 
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